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Abstract
This paper argues that the high-tech manufacturing sector’s location pattern in favor of the 
Capital Region is a key variable that can explain both divergent local manufacturing 
performance and Korea’s monocentric economic geography. My major findings from the 
case study of Samsung Electronics (SEC) can be summarized as follows. First, high-tech 
firms have strong incentives to integrate their R&D and manufacturing divisions spatially, 
because this can encourage process innovation and save substantial time for problem solving 
in existing production lines. Second, high-quality human resources, essential for corporate 
management and R&D activities, are difficult to access outside the Capital Region. Thus, 
uneven geographical distribution of high-quality human resources, combined with the strong 
need for spatial integration between R&D and mass production divisions, caused the uneven 
distribution of the high-tech manufacturing sector. My findings in this paper suggest that 
(i) non-Capital-Region economies will be able to attract high-tech manufacturing jobs only 
after creating a sizable local pool of national talent, and (ii) people-targeting regional 
policies can be more effective than firm-targeting policies in creating the dynamics for 
interregional convergence.
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Table 1_
 Employment (1000 persons) Value-added (billions of Korean Won)
Year Total MFG % MFG Total MFG % MFG
1991 11,356 4,231 37.3 %  236,128 57,051 24.2 %
2006 15,218 3,418 22.5 %  857,444 217,282 25.3 %
Note: MFG = manufacturing.
Source: Computed by author from the Korea Statistics Information System (http://kosis.nso.go.kr).
I. Introduction
The manufacturing sector still forms Korea's key eco-
nomic base. A series of recent government slogans, which 
stress high value-added service sectors such as finance 
and logistics as Korea's new economic base, may give the 
public an impression that manufacturing matters less for 
Korea's economy than before, but this is far from the 
truth. Those who underestimate the sector’s economic 
significance owing to its shrinking share of total national 
employment, if any, may be seeing only part of the real 
situation. As Table 1 shows, whereas the employment 
share of the manufacturing sector in Korea declined from 
37.3 percent in 1991 to 24.2 percent in 2006, the sector’s 
value-added share increased from 24.2 percent to 25.3 
percent during the same period.1) In other words, although 
the manufacturing sector currently hires fewer people than 
before, it contributes even more to the national economy 
in value-added terms. This fact suggests that at present 
Korea has a manufacturing portfolio that has more high 
value-added components than before. 
The high technology (high-tech) segment of the man-
ufacturing sector is in particular of great importance. Most 
manufacturing jobs that have been newly created in Korea 
in the past two decades are in the high-tech sector (Table 
2). Between 2000 and 2006, Korea gained 259,881 
high-tech manufacturing jobs, while losing 174,516 jobs 
in the non-high-tech sector. These numbers symbolically 
show that Korea is no longer an attractive location for 
price-sensitive manufacturing activities, whereas its 
high-tech manufacturing sector is growing. Gyeonggi and 
Chungnam Provinces, whose economies have grown more 
in relative terms in the last two decades than any other 
Korean locality (Table 3), accounted for more than half 
of Korea’s total job gains (138,703 out of 259,881) in the 
high-tech manufacturing sector during the same period.
One puzzle in this trend, which is my main research 
question, is why high-tech producers prefer the Greater 
Capital Region2), a high-cost location where they must 
pay more for production factors, for their mass production 
base. It is understandable that their headquarters and R&D 
divisions are seated near Seoul, because those corporate 
functions tend to put more weight on a set of noneconomic 
factors, such as pre-existing relational assets, specialized 
professional services, and high-quality human resources, 
than on explicit cost savings. But why should this also hold 
true for standardized manufacturing processes, which do 
not seem to have a high demand for high-quality human 
resources or specialized professional services, even if 
they are for high-tech products? 
This paper explores the puzzle in detail with emphasis 
on the role of high-quality human resources3) in the 
high-tech manufacturing process. Although it may be 
commonly argued that the spatial concentration of the 
1) The classification as high-tech or non-high-tech is based on the share of R&D expenditure in annual sales. For further details, see Section 2 
of this paper.
2) In this paper, I refer to the Capital Region and its neighbor Chungnam Province collectively as the Greater Capital Region. 
3) I use the term “high-quality human resources” to refer to those who are essential for either corporate management or R&D functions. They often 
have graduate degrees and rich experience in their professional field. 
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 Changes in Manufacturing (MFG) Employment, 2000-2006
Region MFG Total High-tech MFG* Non-high-tech MFG
Korea 85,365 259,881 -174,516
   Capital Region 9,643 96,099 -86,456
         Gyeonggi Province 146,689 108,236 38,453
   Chungcheong Region 58,858 42,718 16,140
         Chungnam Province 49,332 30,467 18,865
Table 2_
Note: * I borrowed Kwon and Kim (2002)’s definition on the knowledge-based manufacturing sector to define the high-tech manufacturing sector. 
Source: Computed by author from the Establishment Survey Database (http://ups.kosis.kr). 
Table 3_
Regions 1985 1995 2006
Korea 100 100 100
Capital Region 43 48 48
Seoul 25 25 23
Gyeonggi Province 14 18 20
Chungcheong Region 10 10 11
Chungbuk Province 4 3 3
Chungnam Province + Daejeon 6 7 8
Yeongnam Region 31 27 27
Busan 8 6 6
Daegu 4 4 3
The Other Regions 16 15 14
Source: Computed by author from the Korea Statistics Information System (http://kosis.nso.go.kr).
high-tech manufacturing sector in Korea is closely related 
to that of high-quality human resources, a causal link be-
tween the two phenomena has not yet been firmly 
established. This is because few studies have answered 
the following two questions: (i) how does the manu-
facturing process for high-tech products differ from that 
for non-high-tech goods?, and (ii) why do high-tech 
manufacturers, in contrast with their non-high-tech 
counterparts, need high-quality human resources for their 
mass production lines? Although some studies have ex-
plored the location pattern of corporate R&D and its in-
centives in detail, they have not gone further to answer 
these questions (e.g., Kwon 1995; Lee 2002; Park 2006). 
This research is motivated by the need to fill this missing 
dimension in the existing literature.
II. Literature Review
Where do high-tech industries locate? In contrast to 
the neoclassical approach based on the cost minimization 
and profit maximization framework, new location theories 
tend to emphasize culture, relational assets, and in-
stitutions that are embedded in specific locations. Piore 
and Sabel (1984) introduced the concept of flexible spe-
cialization, a reflection of merits of the traditional craft 
production system on the Fordist mass production system, 
as an alternative paradigm to Fordism. Succeeding schol-
ars gave further attention to two core elements of a flexi-
ble specialization model, industry-wide division of labor 
and inter-firm cooperation, in explaining location patterns 
and incentives of high-tech firms. The region, a con-
tinuous territorial space that accommodates a group of 
specialized firms with high economic complementariness, 
came to stand out as a basic spatial unit of production 
(Storper 1997), where transactions costs can be mini-
mized (Scott 1988) and various inter-firm cooperations 
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and informal social interactions can be successfully coor-
dinated and sustained (Saxenian 1994). 
A body of literature underscores a higher possibility of 
innovation as a primary reason why high-tech firms tend 
to geographically agglomerate. Knowledge is one of the 
most crucial production factors in high-tech sectors, and 
in-house capacity for innovation, an ingenious combina-
tion of existing knowledge, forms a high-tech firm's core 
competency (Barney 2007). On the one hand, high-tech 
firms prefer where they can benefit from rich relational 
capital, as they need frequent social interactions to access 
tacit knowledge and constant mutual learning to improve 
their innovative capability. Innovation seldom appears in 
isolation, as valuable knowledge is rarely available for 
market transactions in a timely manner, and often takes 
a tacit form, which is hardly codifiable and transferable 
(Amsden 2001; Nelson 1987). This point is also stressed 
by studies that take the systems approach to innovation―
whether regional, national, or sectoral (Asheim 1996; 
Breschi and Malerba 1997; Cooke 2001; Freeman 1987; 
Lundvall 1992). On the other hand, high-tech firms prefer 
locations where innovation-encouraging environment is 
deeply embedded. Long-lasting relational capital matters 
for high-tech firms, as innovation is a continuous process, 
not a one-shot game. A more complete form of in-
novations appears, when “radical” innovations, delinked 
from old legacy, are incessantly complemented by sub-
sequent “incremental” innovations (Freeman and Soete 
1997).
A set of studies discuss firm location and its incentives 
from economic globalization and spatial division of labor 
perspectives. Vernon (1966) theorized that as a product 
became mature and more competitors existed in the mar-
ket, rents from technological monopoly would decrease, 
while pressure for cost reduction would rise. As a result, 
place of its production would shift gradually from the core 
to the periphery. Despite an increasing attention to 
non-physical factor inputs such as knowledge, recent lit-
erature still sees location-specific factor conditions, as 
well as market penetration, as a key incentive for a firm's 
relocation and expansion stretegy (Shatz and Venables 
2000). A similar picture of spatial division of labor also 
appears in a series of world city studies (Friedmann 1995; 
Taylor 2000). In contrast to a pro-globalist view of eco-
nomic deteritorialization (e.g., Ohmae 1999; Friedman 
2005), world city researchers argued that forces of global 
economic integration would strengthen, not weaken, the 
existing patterns of spatial division of labor on a national 
and global scale. With increasing globalization, corporate 
headquarter functions tend to be concentrated further in 
existing centers, and hierarchy among cities becomes 
clearer (Sassen 2001). Also, globalization never decreases 
the importance of corporate home base, as a firm's com-
petitive advantage is created through interactions with lo-
cation-specific factor conditions, but these conditions 
cannot be easily recreated in other locations (Porter 
1990). In fact, most high-tech leaders still keep their 
core competency in management and R&D in their home 
base (Amsden et al. 2001). 
In sum, the literature review of this section provides 
us with the following implications on high-tech firms' 
location. First, core competency of high-tech firms such 
as in-house technological capabilities is often formed 
through active and continuous interactions with various 
external actors, but location-specific factor conditions, 
which are external to the firms but essential in creating 
their core competency, are hard to be emulated by other 
locations. Second, a large fraction of core competency, 
thus, tends to reside in corporate home base, and its loca-
tion pattern is relatively robust to external shocks. Finally, 
high-tech firms, however, are likely to increase out-
sourcing for their non-core corporate functions such as 
labor-intensive manufacturing processes, or to relocate 
those activities to the place where they can take advantage 
of lower cost factors of production.   
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III. Hypothesis and Methodology
Even in the high-tech sector, a substantial fraction of 
the manufacturing process is quite labor-intensive, and is 
far from the manufacturer's core competency (Sturgeon 
2002). Apple's hit item iPod was developed and designed 
in California, but its actual production and assembly proc-
esses were done outside the firm's home base by various 
foreign electronics manufacturers. There are also a sub-
stantial number of semiconductor manufacturers, which 
outsource part of the manufacturing function (most nota-
bly, wafer manufacturing process) to foundry firms or op-
erate assembly plants in low-cost locations. These ex-
amples coincide with the implications drawn from the pre-
vious section's literature review.  
This is not the case for Korea, however. Until recently, 
the Greater Capital Region has been more successful in 
attracting high-tech manufacturing plants than the rest 
part of Korea, though the former does not necessarily 
provide lower cost factors of production. Why is this so?
I hypothesize that Korea's leading high-tech manu-
facturers, which are often large corporations that depend 
for sources of innovation little on external inter-firm 
networks4), need close organizational and spatial distance 
between their own R&D and manufacturing divisions, and 
thus the location of the sector’s manufacturing plants de-
pends on the location of its R&D workforce. To test this 
hypothesis, I took a qualitative approach based on a case 
study of Samsung Electronics (SEC). I used various sec-
ondary data, both published and unpublished documents, 
for the study of the firm’s history. For primary data col-
lection, I visited SEC’s Suwon and Giheung R&D and man-
ufacturing complexes in 2006 and conducted open-ended 
in-depth interviews between 2006 and 2007, com-
plemented by multiple follow-up email interactions, with 
four SEC engineers and researchers, one Samsung 
Everland mid-level manager, one management board 
member of Mirae Asset (the Real Estate Investment 
Division), and one research fellow of the Samsung 
Economic Research Institute.
I chose SEC for a case study subject for two reasons. 
One is SEC’s importance in Korea’s economy. SEC is one 
of the largest Korean firms in terms of total assets, annual 
sales, and profits. Also, in terms of employment, SEC’s 
domestic divisions alone, which have also greatly influ-
enced the geographical location of its 1,200 (or more) 
primary and many more secondary supplier firms, em-
ployed around 70,000 workers as of 2005 (Kang 2005). 
In this sense, SEC is a prism through which we can ob-
serve Korea’s economy. The other reason is that SEC is 
a high-tech manufacturer, for which both R&D and manu-
facturing divisions are equally crucial. As of 2004, SEC 
alone accounted for 16 percent of Korea’s total exports 
and 40 percent of the total R&D investment made by all 
the firms listed on Korea’s stock exchange (Cho et al. 
2005). In other words, SEC consists of giant divisions for 
innovation and mass production and thus makes it feasible 
to examine location patterns and incentives for both 
knowledge-intensive and standardized production 
activities.
 
IV. A Case Study: Samsung Electronics
SEC was founded in Seoul in 1969. But with the open-
ing of its first manufacturing plant for consumer elec-
tronics, the firm’s headquarters were resettled in Suwon, 
Gyeonggi Province, in 1973. Suwon remained SEC’s 
headquarters for over two decades until 2007. As of 2006, 
SEC had large manufacturing bases in seven cities (Figure 
1). The Suwon complex included the headquarters and 
4) For example, as of 2004, Samsung Electronics alone accounted for 40 percent of the total R&D investment made by all the firms listed on Korea’s 
stock exchange, and the firm's R&D department hired more graduate degree holders than any single university in Korea (Cho et al. 2005).
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Figure 1_
YONGIN, Gyeonggi
• Specialization: Semi-
conductor (memory, system 
LSI*)
• Year of First Operation: 1984
ASAN, Chungnam
• Specialization: Semi-
conductor (assembly, test)
• Year of First Operation: 1991
• Specialization: Display 
(TFT**, LCD***)
• Year of First Operation: 2004
Onyang Complex
Tangjeong Complex
SUWON, Gyeonggi
• Specialization: Official 
headquarter (originally 
located in Seoul between 
1969 and 1973), R&D, 
consumer electronics (TV, 
DVD players)
• Year of First Operation: 1973
HWASEONG, Gyeonggi
• Specialization: Semi-
conductor (memory)
• Year of First Operation:
CHEONAN, Chungnam
• Specialization: Display 
(TFT**, LCD***)
• Year of First Operation: 1996
GWANGJU, Jeonnam
• Specialization: Consumer 
electronics (refrigerators, A/C, 
vacuum cleaners, washing 
machines, etc.)
• Year of First Operation: 1990
• Specialization: Wireless 
communication system, 
Internet equipments, 
printers)
• Year of First Operation: 1977
Gumi 1 Complex
Gumi 2 Complex
• Specialization: Mobile 
phones, Hard disks
• Year of First Operation: 1996
GUMI, Gyeongbuk
SEOUL Office
• Specialization: Part of 
headquarter function
• Year of First Operation: 1975
First Operation in 1970s
First Operation in 1980s
First Operation in 1990s
Note: * LSI = large-scale integration (circuit); ** TFT = thin film transistor; *** LCD = liquid crystal display.
Source: Created by author. 
plants for consumer electronics and digital media. The 
Hwaseong, Yongin, and Asan complexes produced semi-
conductors, while the Yongin and Cheonan complexes 
manufactured display equipment. The Gumi complex, once 
the national mecca of the electronics industry, specialized 
in mobile communication and computer equipment. Finally, 
the Gwangju plant produced white goods such as re-
frigerators and washing machines. 
Three decades ago, SEC’s major divisions were seated 
in two locations. The firm’s headquarters, research cen-
ters, and main manufacturing plants for consumer elec-
tronics were located in Suwon. The Gumi manufacturing 
complex specialized in producing office telecommunication 
devices such as analog switching systems, phones, and fax 
machines. But since then this location pattern has changed 
in a way that reduces the degree of geographical concen-
tration of local production bases. SEC relocated a large 
fraction of its production bases for consumer electronics 
from Suwon to Gwangju and to other developing countries 
such as China, and further concentrated its R&D functions 
in Suwon. Most of SEC’s manufacturing investments dur-
ing the last two decades have been made in other cities 
in the Capital Region or its neighboring provinces, and not 
to the other manufacturing center, Gumi, despite little 
evidence of diseconomies of agglomeration in Gumi.5)
One puzzle arises from the situation described above, 
namely, why SEC has preferred the Greater Capital Region 
to Gumi for manufacturing investment in its more recent 
businesses like the semiconductor and display panel 
sectors. At present, SEC spatially separates R&D and 
5) For example, wage levels in the manufacturing sector (26 million wons per worker and per year in 2004) and population (608 persons per km² 
in 2006) in Gumi are no higher than those in comparable industrial cities in the Capital Region (34 million wons and 1,098 persons for Yongin; 23 
million wons and 4,668 persons for Ansan; 28 million wons and 836 persons for Pyeongtaek; and 26 million wons and 417 persons for Hwaseong—all 
as of 2004). Source: the City of Gumi (http://gumi.go.kr/sogae/sub103.html) and the Province of Gyeonggi 
(http://www.gg.go.kr/0502new/global/about/statistics/stc03/1175823_850.html).
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manufacturing functions for mobile phones: R&D is done 
in Suwon, while manufacturing is done in Gumi. In a certain 
sense, this locational pattern makes good sense from an 
economic perspective, because it is an appropriate spatial 
reflection of each city's comparative advantage. But the 
locational pattern is different for semiconductors and dis-
play panels. Despite the high costs of production factors 
and various policy disincentives, such as a strict govern-
ment-controlled manufacturing investment quota for the 
Capital Region, SEC chose the Capital Region or its prox-
imity to be the manufacturing locations for its semi-
conductors and display panels. Why did this happen?
Another fact that has attracted my attention is that 
Samsung Group recently moved the headquarter functions 
of all its information and communications technology 
(ICT)-related subsidiaries, including SEC, to Samsung 
Town in Seoul’s Gangnam District, which was completed 
in 2008. This decision seems to be worth thoroughly ex-
amining, given that Suwon, where SEC was headquartered, 
is already located in close proximity to Seoul (around 26 
miles). Furthermore, this fact is hard to reconcile with the 
fact that SEC’s business operations have been expanding 
spatially on both a national and a global scale. Why did 
Samsung Group make this decision?
 
SEC began its business in Suwon for several reasons 
(SEC 1999). First, Suwon had sizable land reserves for 
its initial manufacturing complex. Second, Suwon lay in 
proximity to Seoul, Korea’s political and economic center. 
SEC’s management needed to visit Seoul frequently to 
meet high central government officials and foreign busi-
ness partners for purposes of either raising capital or en-
gaging in technology transfer.6)  In addition, Seoul was the 
biggest domestic market for consumer electronics, which 
SEC initially targeted. Thus, Suwon’s excellent access to 
Seoul was of great merit. Third, Suwon, which the 
Seoul-Busan expressway passes through, also provided 
good access to Busan, Korea’s major international seaport. 
Suwon was seated where parts supply and final-goods 
exports could be managed without serious difficulty. 
Finally, electricity and water were well served for in-
dustrial use in Suwon. 
But those initial locational advantages in Suwon created 
an inertial force. SEC further concentrated its manu-
facturing bases in Suwon, and even moved its headquarters 
from Seoul to Suwon to improve efficiency in communica-
tion between headquarters and the manufacturing 
divisions. But not all the firm’s manufacturing divisions 
were settled in Suwon. The firm’s first production base 
for industrial electronics (e.g., analog switches, phones, 
and fax machines) was established in Gumi, not in Suwon. 
Why did SEC decide to disperse its manufacturing divi-
sions geographically in two places by production item 
(consumer electronics vs. office products)? 
This geographical dispersion was not SEC’s original 
intention, but is instead related to the firm’s history. In 
1977, the Korean government established the Korea 
Telecommunication Company (KTC), which specialized in 
producing electronic switching systems (ESS) to meet 
soaring domestic demand for phone service. In two years, 
the KTC completed its main plant in the Gumi industrial 
complex, which at that time had an Asia-high production 
capacity for ESS (660,000 circuits per year). The Korean 
government gave political consideration to Gumi for locat-
ing the KTC plant because, in accord with the 
Comprehensive National Territorial Plan, it wanted to 
raise the city’s profile for becoming the mecca of Korea’s 
electronic industry. In 1980, the KTC was merged into 
SEC according to the government’s privatization policy and 
became the matrix of the firm’s telecommunication 
6) Initially, Samsung Electronics formed a joint venture with Sanyo Electronics of Japan in order to enter the electronics sector. 
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business. Thus, the firm’s geographically bisected pro-
duction system, one in Suwon and the other in Gumi, was 
formed without regard to the firm’s own will. The Gumi 
complex still takes full charge of producing Samsung mo-
bile phones and other telecommunication devices.
As time went by, SEC’s manufacturing bases came to 
be further spatially dispersed. Main semiconductor plants 
have been built in Yongin and Hwaseong since the 
mid-1980s, and display-panel manufacturing complexes 
(LCD and TFT) have been developed in Cheonan and Asan 
since the mid-1990s. Most of the consumer electronics 
plants have been relocated from Suwon to Gwangju or to 
other developing countries as a result of limited land re-
serves for new plants and rising wages. Here a puzzle is 
why the manufacturing investments of SEC’s cutting-edge 
sectors (e.g., semiconductors and display panels) went to 
other cities in the Capital Region or in the Chungcheng 
Region and not to Gumi, which already had SEC’s manu-
facturing clusters and where substantial land reserves and 
low-waged workers still existed.
The semiconductor industry needs several special 
conditions for its location. First, the industry needs ex-
tremely clean air, because semiconductors are sensitive to 
even invisibly minute dust. Second, the industry needs 
places without noise and vibration. Even small noises or 
vibrations can interrupt the production of semiconductors, 
which requires micron-level precision, and thus the plant 
location should be outside the visibility range of highways 
and railways. Third, the industry should be located close 
to high-quality human-resource reserves. Yongin and 
Hwaseong in the Capital Region, which satisfied the above 
three conditions, were the best places for establishing the 
semiconductor industry, in addition to their having large 
developable lands (SEC 1999).
According to several interviewees, SEC originally 
wanted to build display panel plants in the Capital Region 
as well, mainly for considerations of high-quality human 
resources.7) As of 2001, the Capital Region accounted for 
85.4 percent of Korea’s top 20 universities and around 90 
percent of their students and faculty members (Park and 
Kim 2002: 107). But strong government regulations for 
local manufacturing investment, which targeted the Capital 
Region, prohibited the firm from building those plants 
within the region. So SEC avoided these regulations by 
building display manufacturing clusters in Cheonan and 
Asan, outside of but adjacent to the Capital Region. In 
contrast, it is quite difficult to find highly educated work-
ers in Gumi, which is a main reason why the city has failed 
to attract R&D facilities (Kwon et al. 2004). A large 
number of highly educated workers in the Capital Region 
are reluctant to move to local areas like Gumi, which are 
too remote from Seoul, for a number of reasons, such as 
their children’s education or the socio-economic 
infrastructure. 
 
Why then are high-quality human resources (R&D 
work forces) so important in semiconductor and display 
panel “manufacturing” plants? The most distinct charac-
teristic in SEC’s semiconductor and display panel divisions 
is that R&D functions are spatially integrated within man-
ufacturing complexes. SEC performs R&D for semi-
conductors within its Hwaseong/Giheung manufacturing 
complex, and not in Suwon, and similarly operates its dis-
play panel R&D center within its Cheonan/Asan manu-
facturing plants. This locational pattern contrasts with the 
firm’s mobile phone production division, which geo-
graphically disintegrates R&D (in Suwon) from manu-
facturing (in Gumi). To answer this question, we must 
understand the key nature of R&D in semiconductor and 
7) Interview results.
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display panel production.
Both the semiconductor and display panel (SC/DP) 
sectors confront extremely short product life cycles. For 
example, market-leading memory chips, as Hwang’s law8) 
predicts, have changed surprisingly fast, from 128 mega-
byte dynamic random access memory (DRAM) in 2000 to 
256 megabyte DRAM in 2001 to 512 mega-byte DRAM 
in 2004 (Chang 2008). The largest TFT-LCD panels have 
also upgraded quickly, from 57 inches in 2003 to 65 inches 
in 2004 to 82 inches in 2005. In these industries, how 
early and fast and how economically a firm can produce 
new products are as important as the new technologies 
themselves.9)  
In other words, process innovation is as important as 
product innovation in the SC/DP sector. To continue im-
proving existing manufacturing processes as well as de-
veloping new products is a core responsibility of the sec-
tor’s R&D department. Researchers and field workers 
need frequent interactions to discuss the merits and 
shortcomings of the existing production lines. It is crucial 
that researchers and engineers maintain first-hand mon-
itoring of production facilities to understand existing 
problems. Standing meetings in the production line, which 
researchers, line engineers, and decision makers are re-
quired to attend together, are often called by the firm’s 
chief executive officer (CEO).10) Thus, researchers also 
need to be physically close to the production line. In fact, 
of SEC’s five divisions, only the Semiconductor and LCD 
divisions have R&D offices and manufacturing plants 
within the same complex. 
In addition, high pressure for cost savings requires a 
special R&D function for the SC/DP sector that is seldom 
found in traditional manufacturing sectors, namely, to find 
other purposes for existing equipment. The SC/DP sector 
by nature requires huge capital investment in a timely 
manner. When SC/DP manufacturers launch newer gen-
erational products in the market, they do not simply aban-
don production lines for older generational products. To 
minimize sink costs, they must find a way to produce 
newer generational products by using existing equip-
ment.11) This is a job for the R&D department. Of course, 
this task can be completed more successfully and quickly 
when R&D is done in proximity to the production bases.
Problem solving and maintenance in production lines 
are also crucial responsibilities for the R&D divisions of 
the SC/DP sector.12) Given that this sector is highly time 
sensitive, it is not surprising to have one generation prod-
uct in production while the next generation product lines 
are already being built. To win the speed and cost war in 
the global market, market-leading firms often purchase 
the most advanced capital goods available in the market 
before their competitors. By doing so, they can save huge 
financial costs—they not only employ the most 
up-to-date cost-saving technologies, but they also enjoy 
huge discounts from capital goods suppliers to compensate 
for the low stability and potential malfunctioning of early 
products (Shin and Jang 2006). For this reason, various 
technical problems exist in relatively new product lines for 
semiconductors and display panels. Close cooperation be-
tween the R&D division and field engineers is necessary 
to solve these issues as early as possible.
Then what about the case of mobile phone production? 
Mobile phones and semiconductors/display panels have 
critical differences, although they are both considered 
8) That the transistor density of semiconductor chips will double every 12 months.
9) Interview results.
10) Interview results.
11) Interview results.
12) Interview results.
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Table 4_
Unit: billions of Korean Won
 2000 2002 2004 2006 2007
Total Sales* 34,284 (100.0) 40,512 (100.0) 80,629 (100.0) 85,425 (100.0) 98,507 (100.0) 
Domestic Sales* 10,903 (31.8) 12,148 (30.0) 13,051 (16.2) 13,644 (16.0) 14,173 (14.4) 
Mean Inventory** 2,802 (8.2) 2,272 (5.6) 5,803 (7.2) 6,753 (7.9) 7,968 (8.1) 
Transportation Cost 286 (0.8) 395 (1.0) 1,415 (1.8) 1,591 (1.9) 1,803 (1.8) 
Wages 370 (1.1) 536 (1.3) 1,711 (2.1) 1,841 (2.2) 2,085 (2.1) 
Note: * Internal transactions between SEC and its domestic/global subsidiaries are excluded.
** Numerical mean of inventory values between beginning and end of each year.
Numbers in parentheses indicate percentage of each item to each year’s total sales value.
Source: Adapted and calculated by author from Samsung Electronics Annual Report each year.
high-tech items. First, in mobile phone production, prod-
uct innovation matters more than process innovation. 
Mobile phone production lines, once completed, do not 
need to be upgraded as frequently as those for semi-
conductors/display panels, partly because the former are 
quite labor-intensive compared to the latter. Mobile phone 
producers compete on the basis of ingenious combinations 
of standardized and modularized parts components 
(differentiated designs or functions) within the basic ar-
chitecture, such as code division multiple access (CDMA) 
or global system for mobile communication (GSM) 
platforms. In the mobile phone sector, standardized prod-
uct platforms and labor-intensive manufacturing proc-
esses substantially reduce the need for face-to-face 
contacts between the R&D department and manufacturing 
plants; thus, a higher proportion of interactions between 
both departments can be substituted by ICT in the mobile 
device business. In addition, the mobile phone is a final 
good, while semiconductors and display panels are inter-
mediate products. Assembly and raw materials/parts pro-
curement are more crucial for the former item. Thus, the 
mobile phone business is more sensitive to labor and lo-
gistics costs. This fact may partly account for why SEC 
still produces mobile phones in Gumi.
 
SEC currently operates a total of 90 global corporation 
bodies, including 24 manufacturing complexes.13) The 
firm has continuously relocated its production bases for 
matured consumer electronics from Suwon to Gwangju as 
well as to other developing countries. Also, the firm has 
built semiconductor assembly lines in China, as well as 
manufacturing plants for mobile phones in Brazil, Spain, 
and several other places. On the one hand, this global-
ization strategy helps the firm reduce production costs by 
giving it access to abundant low-wage labor forces while 
helping it to avoid trade barriers (e.g., tariffs). On the 
other hand, this strategy can increase logistics costs owing 
to geographically dispersed production bases. Thus, the 
globalization strategy needs to consider both cost-re-
ducing factors and cost-augmenting variables. 
To effectively manage logistics costs, SEC by 2002 had 
established a globe-wide corporate supply chain manage-
ment (SCM) system, which covers the firm’s 24 manu-
facturing complexes and 49 sales/distribution-specialized 
regional offices (Lee et al. 2002). The SCM system, 
which aims to optimize time and costs for the process or-
der-purchase-production-logistics, appears to provide 
SEC an effective tool in controlling its logistics/transport 
costs at a reasonable level. After introduction of the SCM 
system, SEC’s average inventory cycle was reduced sub-
stantially, from eight weeks in 1997 to three weeks in 
2001 (Lee et al. 2002), while the firm’s mean annual in-
13) The official website of Samsung Electronics (http://www.sec.co.kr), as of March 17, 2006.
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ventory value remained relatively stable at around 8 per-
cent of annual sales between 2000 and 2007 (Table 4). 
Although the firm’s total transport costs for products in-
creased from 0.8 percent of annual sales in 2000 to 1.8 
percent in 2007, this was mainly because SEC’s exports 
soared from 2.1 times its domestic sales to 4.1 times dur-
ing the same period. 
Korea’s localities other than the Capital Region should 
regard the fact that firms now have fewer constraints on 
their globalization strategies thanks to SCM as a serious 
threat to their economies. As explained earlier, high-tech 
manufacturing bases prefer the Capital Region or its 
neighbors, where firms can easily acquire high quality hu-
man resources. Labor cost is not a major determinant for 
location in the high-tech sector. But the opposite situation 
holds for matured goods producers. The non-high-tech 
sector is generally price sensitive and faces strong pres-
sure to reduce production costs. If firms can manage lo-
gistics costs effectively by introducing SCM, then labor 
costs will be a more critical determinant than logistics 
costs for the location of standardized production activities. 
In this situation, Korea’s non-Capital Region economies 
are sandwiched between the Capital Region domestically 
and lower-income developing countries globally. On the 
one hand, they are losing domestic competition for 
high-tech manufacturing jobs to the Capital Region, while 
on the other they often fail to bid competitive wages for 
price-sensitive manufacturing jobs against low-income 
developing countries. 
 
At present, around a third of SEC’s total employees are 
working in R&D activities. In the past, this huge R&D 
workforce was scattered among Seoul, Suwon, Yongin 
(Giheung), and Seongnam (Bundang). Spatially dispersed 
R&D activities were neither efficient nor productive be-
cause physical distance often hindered cooperation among 
R&D offices. If each office were specialized for a different 
technology, fewer interactions among R&D offices would 
imply fewer possibilities for innovation. One dominant 
trend in the current global electronics market is digital 
convergence. For example, the mobile phone is evolving 
into a synthetic digital device by merging the functions of 
the MP3 music player, the digital camera, the television, 
and even the computer. To produce a new mobile phone 
model, the R&D departments of both the ICT and the 
Digital Media divisions should cooperate closely with one 
another from a very early stage of development. Given that 
the mobile phone uses special types of semiconductors and 
display panels, the project may also need some inputs from 
the Semiconductor and LCD divisions. In addition, some 
divisions share a number of common technologies, such as 
those for semiconductors and LCDs. Thus, SEC has need-
ed to concentrate its R&D activities in one location.
Can these face-to-face interactions among R&D 
workers be replaced by ICT-mediated communications? 
None of the interviewees were positive on this question. 
Researchers and engineers exchange highly tacit knowl-
edge several times even in a day. They cannot fully ex-
plain what they know and what they want to know only 
through the phone, the Internet, or the screen. All four 
engineers I interviewed said they could not even imagine 
ICT-organized idea meetings. With one voice they em-
phasized physical proximity for interactions. 
In response to these needs, SEC relocated the R&D 
departments of both the ICT and  Digital Media divisions 
(as well as the Consumer Electronics division) to two 
buildings in the Suwon Complex in 2001 and 2005, 
respectively.14) Part of the semiconductor R&D depart-
14) As mentioned earlier, R&D offices for the Semiconductor and LCD Divisions remain seated in the Yongin (Giheung) Complex and the Cheongan-Asan 
Complex, respectively.
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ment also moved to Suwon. In the intermediate future, 
SEC plans to particularize the Suwon Complex for R&D 
activities by relocating existing manufacturing plants for 
consumer electronics to other areas. Reasons why SEC 
should concentrate R&D activities in Suwon include the 
following: (i) Suwon’s symbolic position as the hometown 
of SEC; (ii) available land reserves in the Suwon Complex; 
(iii) Suwon’s easy accessibility to Seoul (i.e., ease of at-
tracting high-quality human resources); and (iv) Suwon’s 
proximity to both the semiconductor and LCD complexes.
 
Recently, Samsung Group completed the spatial re-
organization project of its ICT-related subsidiaries 
(especially the management and control functions). By 
2008, the headquarters of SEC, Samsung Display Interface 
(SDI), and Samsung Electro-Mechanics (SEM) had been 
relocated to three new buildings, called Samsung Town, in 
Seoul’s Gangnam area. One question is why Samsung 
Group chose to relocate SEC’s headquarters from Suwon 
to its present location, although the two localities are close 
enough (around 26 miles). In addition, why would 
Samsung Group want to concentrate geographically the 
headquarters functions of its ICT-related subsidiaries in 
one location?
One interesting fact to emerge from my interviews is 
that all five of the Samsung-related interviewees recog-
nized SEC’s Seoul Taepyeongro office as the firm’s head-
quarters, although SEC was officially headquartered in 
Suwon when the interviews were conducted. According to 
the interviewees, all important decisions for SEC were 
made in its Seoul office and not in its official headquarters 
in Suwon. Whenever an important issue arose, the CEO of 
SEC called a board meeting in the Seoul office. It was not 
uncommon for directors and key management board mem-
bers, many of whom had two offices (one in Seoul and the 
other in a local manufacturing complex), to travel between 
their offices in Seoul and those outside the city by heli-
copter to save time. The Seoul Taepyeongro office was 
first established in 1975 to more effectively manage for-
eign branches and more easily raise funds (SEC 1999). At 
that time, Seoul was not only Korea’s socioeconomic cen-
ter, which provided a superior business environment to 
that of any other city in Korea, but also its political center, 
where most of Korea’s key central government agencies 
were settled. The situation remains the same. Seoul is still 
the best domestic location for corporate headquarters, 
where firms have an advantage in accessing various pri-
vate and public resources. No other city in Korea can 
compete with Seoul in the quality and quantity of its 
transport and ICT infrastructure, professional producer 
services, human resources, and various busi-
ness/culture/leisure facilities, or in accessibility to public 
services and political power (for lobbying purposes). 
Gun-Hee Lee, the then-president of Samsung Group, 
said that Samsung Group needed Samsung Town to in-
crease the speed of the decision-making process (Chosun 
Daily Newspaper, January 26, 2005). SEC’s projects often 
need some involvement of other Samsung ICT affiliates. 
For example, SEC’s hit item for the year 2000, a 34-inch 
flat panel TV model, was jointly developed from earlier 
stages in cooperation with three other Samsung sub-
sidiaries, SDI, SEM, and Samsung Corning (Lee et al. 
2002). Group-level issues of this kind are discussed and 
determined in biannual presidential board meetings. 
Further details on these issues are then discussed among 
directors or working-level officials at least monthly if not 
more often. The need for joint collaboration among ICT 
subsidiaries continues to increase. But before 2008, the 
headquarters of Samsung’s ICT subsidiaries were geo-
graphically dispersed. SDI was headquartered in northern 
Seoul, for example, and SEM was in Suwon. Samsung 
Group wanted to eliminate this inefficiency, which inter-
fered with speedy and frequent interactions among its ICT 
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subsidiaries. 
At the same time, the corporate headquarters and R&D 
offices also need frequent face-to-face interactions to 
fine-tune headquarters-drawn big pictures and re-
searcher-embodied details. Until the Samsung Town 
project was completed, it took over two hours by car, 
mainly because of chronic traffic jams, to commute one 
way between SEC’s Seoul office and the Suwon Complex, 
although their physical distance is very short.15) The 
commuting time between Samsung Town and the Suwon 
Complex has now been reduced to less than one hour.16) 
In sum, crucial corporate decisions still depend on 
face-to-face interactions in SEC’s headquarters. It would 
be unrealistic to expect ICT to substitute perfectly for 
these needs. The firm’s headquarters still prefer pre-ex-
isting socioeconomic centers, and physical distance among 
the relevant headquarters offices remains important for 
their active interaction. This is why Samsung Group re-
cently decided to make an ICT subsidiary headquarters 
cluster in Seoul. With Samsung Town, Samsung Group 
looks forward to a speedier decision-making process and 
a greater synergy effect among its ICT subsidiaries. 
V. Conclusions
I have discussed why the high-sector manufacturing 
function has been increasingly attracted to the Capital 
Region or its proximity rather than elsewhere in Korea. 
This SEC case study reveals two important findings. One 
is that high-tech sector manufacturing jobs, as well as 
corporate headquarters and R&D functions, are more 
globalization proof than price-sensitive ones. As exem-
plified by SEC’s case, high-tech manufacturing jobs 
(SEC’s SD/DP divisions) still remain in Korea or have 
been newly created, while price-sensitive manufacturing 
jobs (SEC’s home electronics division) continue to leave 
Korea for low-cost locations. Now firms, with ICT-based 
SCM techniques, can manage rising transport and logistics 
costs, caused by the increasing geographical dispersal of 
their production bases, more efficiently than before. The 
non-Capital Region economies, as a result, confront huge 
pressure to expand the high-tech portion of their local 
manufacturing bases.
The other finding is that high-tech manufacturing bas-
es in Korea are located where there is a large pool of 
high-quality human resources because of the strong need 
that high-tech producers have for spatial integration be-
tween their R&D and mass production divisions. For ex-
ample, process innovation is as important as product in-
novation for the R&D department of SEC’s SC/DP 
divisions. Both researchers and engineers should have a 
thorough, often first-hand, knowledge of existing manu-
facturing lines, and they should learn from field engineers 
or workers about existing or potential problems that could 
be improved so that they can come up with solutions for 
how to produce the same product at a lower cost, or how 
to produce various products using the same equipment or 
production lines. In addition, because industrial sectors of 
this kind are highly time-sensitive, they will often try to 
introduce more advanced technologies or machines, though  
not yet fully tested, to their production lines earlier than 
their competitors. Thus, it is not uncommon for new pro-
duction lines to have various technical problems, and 
sometimes they must be modified substantially. Because 
these technical problems need to be solved as quickly as 
possible, a close spatial integration between the R&D and 
manufacturing divisions is a big plus. 
In Korea, this strong need for such integration in the 
high-tech sector has had a negative impact on interre-
gional economic divergence, because most of the 
15) My own experiment at non-rush hour times on a weekday.
16) Based on the SEC-operated commuting bus schedule table (Yangjae-Suwon Route), which was provided by an interviewee.
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high-quality human resources, in contrast with unskilled 
or semi-skilled workers who can be easily found any-
where in Korea, are concentrated around Seoul. Thus, 
firms have a strong incentive to build high-tech manu-
facturing bases near Seoul where they can effectively 
conduct R&D activities. In sum, access to high-quality 
human resources affects R&D locations, while R&D loca-
tions in turn determine high-tech manufacturing locations. 
In conclusion, I believe that an effective interregional 
convergence mechanism in Korea can be created with an 
effort for a spatial redistribution of domestic high-quality 
human resources. In his bestselling book, Florida (2003) 
argues that most declining local economies in the United 
States cannot be revitalized without hosting the “creative 
class” in the first place. My conclusion shares the same 
insight with his, although he defines the “creative class” 
more broadly than high-quality human resources that I 
focus on in this paper. It seems clear to me what 
non-Capital Region economies need to do first to build a 
strong high-tech manufacturing base: that is to create a 
solid local pool of national talent. High-tech firms will not 
be much interested in locations where access to 
high-quality human resources is hard, even though pro-
duction costs may be low. In this sense, regional policies 
that target people (e.g., economic subsidies for 
high-quality human resources) could be more effective 
than those that focus on firms (e.g., tax incentives for new 
manufacturing plants) as an initial step for creating inter-
regional convergence dynamics. 
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